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Abstract
Paid maternity leave’s effect on women’s real wage growth is indeterminate in theory.
Paid maternity leave could help a woman return to the same job postpartum, reducing the
unemployment in between jobs (which we see as external leaves). Simultaneously, paid
maternity leave could incentivize women to take more leave within a job (which we see as
internal leaves). According to the human capital theory, if more women increase leave-taking
due to the subsidy on leave and the cheaper opportunity cost of pregnancy, women’s overall
productivity will decline and their wage growth will slow down. This analysis uses the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY-79) to investigate which one of the two opposing
effects of paid maternity leave prevails. Our empirical findings suggest that holding all else
equal, an increase in leave-taking led to a bigger decrease in the real wage growth for women
who did not receive paid maternity leave compared to women who did receive paid maternity
leave.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Currently in the United States of America (U.S.), an employee is entitled to take up to 12
weeks of unpaid leave for the birth and care of a newborn child. The Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA), enacted in 1993, guarantees the entitlement for employees working at a workplace
with 50 or more employees. The goal is to help parents achieve a healthy balance between “their
work and family responsibilities by allowing them to take reasonable unpaid leave” (U.S.
Department of Labor 1993).
While FMLA establishes the foundation of parental leave policy in the U.S., several
opinions exist to implement changes to the act. One opinion believes that FMLA should make
the shift from guaranteeing unpaid leaves to paid leaves. Four states have made this shift to
administer monetary benefits to individuals who take leaves to care for newborns: California,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and New York.1 A second opinion, however, disagrees with
providing benefits for the leaves, arguing that a presence of paid leaves will incentivize
individuals to increase leave-taking, thus hurting their work productivity.
The debate concerns women who desire to have children since, relative to men, giving
birth puts more physical and psychological strain on women. The term maternity leave describes
the leave a woman takes to give birth and recover from the experience. FMLA and vacation days
are two avenues through which women take time off from work, prepartum and postpartum.
Whether or not maternity leaves should be supplemented with pay affects fertility rates and,
more importantly for this thesis’s focus, the wage growth of women.

1

Refer to table 1 for more details.
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Proponents who support implementing paid maternity leave argue that the benefits will
help women. A paid maternity leave alleviates the financial burden childbirth places on mothers
who leave work to give birth and recover physically. A paid maternity leave policy also helps
mothers to continue in the jobs held prepartum. By continuing with the same job postpartum,
women re-enter the labor market at a wage similar to what she was earning before the leave.
With a paid maternity leave policy, the woman decreases her unemployment between jobs all the
way to zero.
Opponents, however, counter that such an implementation will hurt women. The presence
of a paid maternity leave policy incentivizes more women to get pregnant and take leaves from
the job more often. Leave-taking deteriorates the worker’s productivity, regardless of the gender.
Thus, the argument predicts that the mother wage penalty will increase as a result to more
women taking more maternity leaves from work. Another point is that the employer, although
not necessarily required to compensate for the benefits themselves, a) must bear the training
costs of the replacement worker and b) will hire less women to anticipate women’s higher
chance of a career interruption. Consequently, the female labor force will decrease, hurting
women’s overall financial autonomy as a group.
From a theoretical perspective, a paid maternity leave’s overall effect is indeterminate
due to two opposing forces. Both the opponents and proponents’ main concern is how a paid
maternity leave subsidizes leave-taking and reduces the opportunity costs of a pregnancy. They
differ in opinion as to which which of the following effects will prevail.
Paid maternity leave has a negative effect on women’s employment and wage growth
because it will induce leave-taking within the same job. The leave-taking within the same job can
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be viewed us internal leave-taking. The subsidy for internal leave-taking and lower opportunity
cost associated with pregnancy will increase the demand for leave-taking within the same job.
Subsequently, an employee’s productivity and wage growth will decrease compared to someone
who did not take a leave.
Paid maternity leave also has a positive effect on women’s employment and wage growth
because it will decrease unemployment between different jobs. The unemployment between
different jobs can be seen as external leave-taking. Without access to paid maternity leave, a
woman risks losing her job or quits completely together in order to give birth. With the guarantee
that the woman will not lose her job for taking a leave, she will be incentivized to return to the
same job postpartum and utilize her firm-specific knowledge. The return to the same job
decreases her external leave-taking.
This empirical paper analyzes the net effect that paid leave-taking can have on the real
wage evolution. Leave-taking, according to the human capital model, will always be detrimental
to productivity and the real wage growth because it disrupts capital accumulation. If, however,
the positive effect of paid leave-taking prevails, then leave-taking will have a less negative effect
on the real wage growth for mothers who took a paid leave than for mothers who took an unpaid
leave. If the negative effect of paid leave-taking prevails, then leave-taking will have a more
negative effect on the real wage growth for mothers who took a paid leave than for mothers who
took an unpaid leave. For our study, group A is the sample of mothers took paid leaves, and
group B is the sample of mothers who did not take paid leaves.
Our decision to focus on the mothers derives from multiple reasons. Firstly, the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY-79) does not gather data on paternity leaves. It
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would be ideal to compare the different effects of paternity and maternity leaves on wage
growth, but the lack of data does not allow this analysis. Secondly, there is a general recognition
that the mother wage gap disproportionately accounts for the gender wage gap that persists
today. Blau and Kahn (2017) finds “considerable empirical evidence [that] indicates a negative
relationship between children and women’s wages, commonly known as the motherhood wage
penalty.” This analysis will contribute directly to the discussion on the motherhood wage penalty
and contribute indirectly to that of the gender wage gap.
Thirdly, paid maternity leave is a topic that is increasingly receiving attention across
North America. This investigation is crucial in today’s age when the conversation of
implementing paid parental leave policies (for both mothers and fathers) is gaining momentum.
The Canadian province of Quebec, for example, has recently begun to offer paid parental leave
tailored for fathers. New York became the fourth state to implement a paid parental leave policy
on January 1, 2018. With several states considering implementation, it is important to investigate
the effects paid maternity leave policies may have.
Paid maternity leave is an intriguing topic to study because similar to that of abortion, the
discussion of paid maternity leave concerns life and population of the planet. Providing paid
maternity leave has been shown to correlate with boosts in birth rates and population growth
(Risse 2006). Since this paper focuses on the U.S., I will leave other researchers to grapple with
the question of the nation’s role in the global population growth and exclude the effect of paid
maternity leave on U.S. fertility rates. I am mainly concerned with the economic impact paid
maternity leave has on females’ long run wage.

7

We begin the paper with chapter 2 which states the contribution of this thesis to the
literature on paid maternity leave. Chapter 2 also establishes the hypotheses we will be testing
with our empirical analysis. Chapter 3 then discusses the history of paid family policies and its
potential effects on women’s wage growth. Chapter 4, then, outlines the existing papers that are
dominant in the discussion about paid maternity leave. The paper continues with Chapter 5,
which establishes the empirical model that we will build and explains the NLSY data we use in
detail. Chapter 6 summarizes the empirical results we find and explains why we take the steps
we take in our statistical analysis. Chapter 7 is the conclusion that discusses the implications of
the empirical results. I situate the implementation of paid maternity leave within the context of a
social discourse in the U.S.
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Chapter 2: My Thesis Contribution
My thesis contributes to the discussion surrounding paid maternal leave policies by
conducting a national level analysis to test the theoretically-indeterminate effect of paid
maternity leave on the real wage growth. Paid maternity leave would have a negative effect on
the real wage growth if the negative effect of increased internal leave-taking prevails. However,
if the positive effect of decreased external leave-taking prevails, paid maternity leave would have
a positive effect on the real wage growth.
For the analysis, our null hypothesis states that paid leaves and unpaid leaves have the
same negative effect on the real wage growth.
Ho: |β1A|  = |β1B|

[2.1]

In other words, the negative effect of paid leave due to increased internal leave-taking cancels
out the positive effect of paid leave due to decreased external leave-taking. The cancellation of
the effects implies that paid leave policy has no significant effect over the real wage growth of
women. For our analysis, leave is measured as total weeks of gap from work in the year
(weeksgap). β1 is the coefficient of weeksgap, which is the amount of weeks of annual work
absence.
Our alternate hypothesis states that unpaid leaves have a more negative effect on the real
wage growth than paid leaves do.
Ha: |β1A|  < |β1B|

[2.2]
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The alternate hypothesis is true if the positive effects of paid leave due to decreased external
leave-taking is greater the negative effects due to increased external leave-taking.
For this analysis, we do not use the Cox test or other approaches to test the joint
hypotheses. Our null hypothesis involves coefficients from two non-nested models. Pesaran and
Weeks (1999) define non-nested models as models that “belong to ‘separate’ families of
distributions, in the sense that none of the individual models may be obtained from the
remaining” by parameter restrictions. Ideally with non-nested hypotheses, one would utilize the
modified (centered) log-likelihood ratio procedure (the Cox test) or other tools to conduct a
statistical analysis. Because we lack the mathematical background to do so, we will simply
compare the magnitudes of β1A and β1B across the non-nested models. Because of the simple
comparison of the magnitudes, we do not know if the null hypothesis could be rejected with
statistical significance if the null hypothesis ends up being incorrect.
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Chapter 3: Paid Family Policies
In 1978, the US government passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, protecting women
against employers’ discrimination based on her pregnancy status. The act prohibits employers
from rejecting or firing a woman due to her pregnancy (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 2009). The act further mandates that employers provide paid leave for pregnancy
and childbirth if the firm has an existing disability program for other medical disabilities (Morris,
Calvert, and Williams 2015). Employers who do not have an existing disability program,
however, can choose not to provide paid leave for pregnancy and childbirth (Brake and
Grossman 2014). Additionally, the anti-discrimination act does not guarantee that the medical
condition of pregnant women requires breaks and/or temporary assignments to “lighter” duties.
Because of these shortcomings of the act, several states are passing their own laws to ensure that
pregnant women are protected, going as far as to provide periods of paid leave (Schulte 2014).
While most of its industrialized counterparts provide mothers and fathers with rights to a
paid leave upon childbirth, “the United States is one of the only two nations (the other being
Papua New Guinea) that do not guarantee paid maternity leave to new mothers” (Baum and
Ruhm 2016). The FMLA was enacted in 1993, requiring employers with at least 50 employees to
provide up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave (Ruhm 2011). Currently, California, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, and New York stand as the only states in the US that have implemented paid
parental leave laws in 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2018 respectively.
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Table 1: Four States’ Paid Leave Laws
State

Coverage/Eligibility

Nature of Paid Leave

To Care For

California
(2004)

Employee must have
worked for employer
for ≥1 year with ≥1250
hours of service.

Paid leave is up to 6
weeks with 55% of
employee’s weekly
wage, from a minimum
of $50 to a maximum
of $1067, funded
through employee-paid
payroll taxes and
administered through
the state’s disability
program.

Child, spouse, parent,
or domestic partner.

New Jersey
(2009)

Employee must have
worked ≥20 calendar
weeks or have earned
≥1000 times the state
minimum wage ($8.60)
during the 52 weeks
before the leave.

Paid leave is up to 6
weeks with 66% of
employee’s weekly
wage, with a maximum
of $524. Leaves could
be paid, unpaid, or a
combination.

Child, spouse, parent,
domestic partner,
parent-in-law, and
grandparent.

Rhode Island
(2014)

All private sector
employers and public
sector employers who
opt into the paid leave
program.

Paid leave is 4 weeks
for the birth, adoption
or fostering and up to
30 weeks of paid leave
for an employee’s
disability, providing a
minimum benefit of
$72 and maximum of
$752 per week,
depending on earnings.
The program is funded
by employee payroll
taxes and administered
through the state’s
temporary disability
program.

Child, spouse, parent,
domestic partner,
parent-in-law, and
grandparent.

Continues on the next page
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Table 1 cont’d:
New York
(2018)

All private employers
must cover their
employees, full-time or
part-time. Employee
must have worked ≥26
consecutive weeks.

As of 2018, the
maximum leave
allowed for a period of
52 weeks is 8 weeks. In
2019, the maximum
leave period will be 10
weeks, and in 2021, the
period will be 12
weeks. The benefit
amount is 50% of an
employee’s average
weekly wage or 50% of
the state weekly wage
($540 as of 2018). It
will increase to be 55%
in 2019, 60% in 2020,
and 67% in 2022.

Child, spouse, parent,
domestic partner,
parent-in-law,
grandparent,
step-parent, or someone
who is in the place of a
parent of the employee.

The design of the paid parental leave policies, however, play an important role at
determining which parent takes the leave for a heterosexual couple. Not only are maternity
leaves more widely available than paternity leaves, women take family-related leaves
disproportionately more than their male counterparts even under a shared parental system
because they have traditionally been the focus of work-family policies (O’Brien 2013). In light
of this, countries such as Norway, Sweden, Germany, Iceland, and Canada have adopted paid
leaves policies to encourage fathers to take leaves through a father’s quota or “daddy leave”
(Patnaik 2016). Patnaik (2016) finds that in the Canadian province of Quebec, the father’s quota
“increased fathers' participation rates by 250% and leave duration by 3 weeks.” Such policies
typically provide a quota of days solely for the father upon the birth of a child. The focus on
fathers may encourage heterosexual couples to break away the traditional division of labor that
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stunts mothers’ wage growth but leaves fathers’ unharmed by placing mothers in the home for
childcare.
While the Pregnancy Discrimination Act guarantees that women do not lose their jobs
due to pregnancy, it does not protect women from statistical discrimination of employers during
hiring. In addition, FMLA and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act exempt all small companies
from abiding. In the case of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, a firm with fewer than 15
employees do not have to abide by it (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2008).
These are factors to keep in mind while reading this paper, because they significantly affect the
long run real wage evolution of women. For the purpose of this thesis, however, employer
discrimination is not an area of focus. Regardless, we acknowledge that in this day and age, the
gender wage gap will only converge when we place the same level of expectation regarding
childcare on both mothers and fathers (Miller 2018).
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Chapter 4: Literature Review
There is a significant amount of literature analyzing the gender wage gap in the US
market. Mincer and Polachek (1974) use the human capital model to state that the wage gap is a
result of women’s shorter, less continuous labor force participation due to events such as the
arrival of a child. Thus, the arrival of a child is the core of the human productivity model’s
explanation for the gender earning gap. A leave of any nature would disrupt the women’s labor
force participation and hurt her long run wage evolution. The career interruption disrupts
accumulation of labor market experience and job training. After returning from the pregnancy
leave, the woman is supposedly not as productive as before she left. This is likely to be more
evident with human capital intensive occupations (such as doctors and professors) than labor
intensive occupations (such as waiters and janitors).
In support of Mincer and Polachek’s finding, Becker (1985) finds that women are more
likely to work part time and discontinuously compared to men due to childbearing and traditional
division of labor. Before the child’s actual arrival, women expecting a shorter career life possess
less incentives to invest in education and job-specific training, placing their human capital level
lower than women who do not have the same expectations. However, Becker (1993) admits that
the situation is changing due to a general decrease in family size, increase in divorce rates, and
the growth of the service sector, where most women seek employment.
Blau and Kahn (2000) highlights the role of wage structure in the human capital model.
“If, as the human capital model suggests, women have less experience than men, on average, the
higher the return to experience received by workers, regardless of sex, the larger will be the
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gender gap in pay” (Blau and Kahn 2000). Blau and Kahn extend this to segregation of
occupation, stating that the higher the premium for working in the male sector, the larger the
gender pay gap. In a self-claimed “merit-based” society, however, such a wage structure is not
seen as problematic even if it perpetuates inequalities.
While this paper focuses on paid maternity leaves’ effects on the real wage evolution, the
demographic outcomes cannot be ignored. Although the human capital model predicts that
taking a maternity leave could be detrimental to women’s real wage evolution relative to that of
non-mothers (both men and women), existing literature suggests that paid maternity leave
policies have a positive effect on birth outcomes. Stearns (2015) finds that in the US, “paid
maternity leave reduces the share of low birthweight births by 3.2 percent” and “decreases the
likelihood of early term births [which occur after 37-38 weeks of gestations opposed to full term
births which occur at 39-40 weeks] by 6.6 percent.” Essentially, Stearns’ finding implies that
mothers for whom paid maternity leave is available have a healthier and less risky delivery
process for both herself and her newborn.
It is not the quality of the delivery process but also the quantity that are affected. Risse
(2006) finds in Australia that “paid maternity leave has a statistically significant effect on the
pregnancy rates of women,” suggesting that “national paid maternity leave legislation would
encourage women to bring forward the timing of children and help to slow down the aging of the
population.” Being a country with low fertility rates in comparison to similar nations, Australia
aims to address this sensitive issue with multiple approaches such as the Fair Work Commission.
This commission provides paid parental leave that administers a pay scheme for up to 18 weeks.
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With an aging population of Baby Boomers, the US may want to take a couple of pages out of
Australia’s book if the nation wants to prevent a declining population growth.
While this paper investigates maternity leave’s effects on the real wage evolution of a
mother, we recognize the health benefits of a leave. The physical and mental impacts childbirth
can have are not to be ignored. McGovern et al. (1997) found that “for women taking more than
12 weeks leave, time off work had a positive effect on vitality.” Their findings suggest that both
physical and mental vitality benefit from time off, of which some subjects took more than 20
weeks of. With the health benefits, however, comes a potential for economic consequences.
Ruhm (1998) presents work on the economic consequences of parental leave mandates
from Europe. The author argues that a) short periods (described as three months) of paid parental
leave boost the ratio of women’s employment to that of the population while having a small
effect on wages and b) longer periods (nine months) raise the ratio but lower hourly wages.
Ruhm elegantly explains the dynamics of the labor market after a parental leave mandate:
Parental leave mandates are likely to shift the labor supply curve of the groups
most probable to use it to the right (relative to those workers less likely to take
leave). The demand curve moves to the left… to the extent that nonwage costs
(e.g., expenses associated with hiring and training temporary replacements)
increase [if] leave benefit are paid primarily by the government. (Ruhm 1998)
After conducting his analysis, he finds that paid leave is positively related to the percentage of
females employed and negatively related to relative wages the lengthier the entitlement. He
proposes three possible reasons why rights to extended parental leave may reduce wages. First,
he states that the demand for labor is inelastic (around -0.3), “implying that a 1 percent rise in
labor supply will reduce wages by more than 3 percent” (Ruhm 1998). Second, the absences
from work impose significant nonwage costs on firms via searching costs for replacement
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workers. Third, women who were “baby-bunching” (i.e. giving birth consecutively to minimize
time away from work) before the leave mandate may now bunch less than before, causing a
higher depreciation of human capital.
There is evidence to suggest that baby-bunching decreases the effect that additional births
have on the mother’s labor market involvement and wage growth. Troske and Voicu (2013) find
in their analysis that reducing the birthgap (interval between births) “reduce the effect of children
on labor supply--the main component of the opportunity cost of children--which, in turn, reduces
losses due to forgone wages, forgone human capital investments, and human capital
depreciation.” If Ruhm (1998) is correct in his postulation that leave mandate may reduce
baby-bunching, a paid maternity leave could further reduce baby-bunching. The reduction in
baby-bunching, in turn, could have a negative effect on women’s, specifically mother’s, labor
market involvement and real wage growth.
Joesch’s (1997) report investigates the relationship between having access to paid leave,
the exit from work, and the reentry to work in the U.S. She finds evidence to challenge the idea
that paid maternity leave will incentivize women to take more leave time. In her study, women
with access to paid maternity leave interrupted work later during pregnancy and reentered sooner
once the child was at least 2 months old, ceteris paribus. The author concludes that “if the goal of
a paid leave policy is to enable parents to spend time with their infants without giving up work,”
then a paid leave that is longer can help but only up to a point (Joesch 1997).
A more recent study by Hofferth and Curtin (2006) supports both Joesch and Ruhm’s
works. Hofferth and Curtin investigate mothers’ postpartum employment patterns and wages
before and after the 1993 FMLA. Agreeing with Joesch, they find that women who had a child
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after FMLA rebounded more quickly and were more likely to continue with the same job as
before the leave. However, they found that the women who did not continue with the same job
postpartum saw a decline in their wages, supporting Ruhm’s findings. Overall, Hofferth and
Curtin’s results suggest that the FMLA boosted employment and retention among mothers but
lowered wages.

19

Chapter 5: Empirical Model
This paper utilizes the panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY-79). The survey began with 12,686 individuals aged 14 to 22, following them annually
from 1979 and then biennially from 1994 until 2016. After accounting for missing observations
due to non-interview and death and excluding males, we are left with 6,147 females, 4,931 of
whom have had at least 1 child. The collected information concentrated on participants’
characteristics and their experiences in and out of the labor market. The focus of this thesis is on
these 4,931 females from 5 years before and 25 years after the birth of their first child.
As with most researchers who use data collected for purposes other than the research at
hand, I found myself wishing for more data. The original vision of this investigation was to
compare the impacts of a maternity leave vs. a paternity leave on wage evolution. The NLSY-79,
however, does not collect any data on paternity leaves. For this reason, we are not able to pursue
the original vision. Regardless, we believe our work does make a unique contribution to the
existing literature due to its national perspective.
A problem with panel data is the tendency to be deterministic or stochastic over time,
leading to non-stationarity. With non-stationarity, we could see misspecification of results or
spurious regressions, inflating the r-squared values and F- and t-statistics. Additionally, simple
correlation coefficients are unreliable tools of measurement because of the data’s timespan of 37
years. Furthermore, we need to account for numerous immeasurable factors that we assume to be
invariant over time, such as risk adversity. For these reasons, we will utilize fixed effects
generalized least squares regressions to build our model. In the next chapter, we provide
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Hausman Tests that support our decision to choose a fixed effects model over one of random
effects.
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝒙𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝒊𝒕 + 𝑫𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕

[5.1]

(𝒀)𝒊𝒕 = 𝒇[(PC)𝒊𝒕, (NW)𝒊𝒕, (L)𝒊𝒕-1, (HK)𝒊𝒕, log(u)it ; 𝑫𝒊 ] + 𝜺𝒊𝒕

[5.2]

The dependent variable Y is log(real wage), and real wage will be taken from the primary
job. Personal characteristics (PC) includes age, number of children, and the time between the
birth of first child and the birth of the last. Because 7.68% of the observations possess
information on industry and 7.76% on occupation, it is not possible to meaningfully account for
industry on occupation. We hope that education acts as a proxy for the nature of the occupation
of the women. That being said, human capital (HK) includes education. Leave (L) measures the
amount of weeks not worked. Dummy variables (Di) account for several time variant exogenous
variables such as the paid leave marker and marriage. Di also includes year dummies to account
for variation over time.
For ease of reading, we remind the reader that the group of mothers who received paid
leave in their lifetime will be referred to as group A, while the group of mothers who did not
receive paid leave will be referred to as group B.
Table 2: Referred to as
Group of Mothers

Referred to as

Who Received Paid Leave

Group A

Who Did Not Receive Paid Leave

Group B
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Data
As stated before, the analysis focuses on 4,931 females who have had at least had one
child. From table 3, however, we can see that the number of mothers in the study fluctuates from
year to year. The change in the number could not be due completely to death, since if it were the
case, the number would decrease over time. However, the actual count of mothers of the study
decreases and then increases for some years. This reflects a number of subjects who are not
consistently responding to the surveys. The fluctuation then begs the question, how many
individuals out of the total are actually reliable? The dubious nature of the fluctuation in subjects
throughout the panel data is something the reader should keep in mind while reading this
analysis.
Table 3: Count of Mothers in the Study
Year Group A Group B

Total

Change

Year

Group A

Group B

Total

Change

N/A

1992

1114

2680

3794

10

1979

1210

3721

4931

1980

1182

3581

4763

-168 1993

1117

2698

3815

21

1981

1190

3597

4787

24 1994

1087

2624

3711

-104

1982

1187

3562

4749

-38 1996

1076

2593

3669

-42

1983

1184

3604

4788

39 1998

1073

2555

3628

-41

1984

1183

3585

4768

-20 2000

1029

2441

3470

-158

1985

1171

3298

4469

-299 2002

981

2360

3341

-129

1986

1152

3226

4378

-91 2004

1000

2372

3372

31

1987

1154

3191

4345

-33 2006

986

2328

3314

-58

1988

1144

3158

4302

-43 2008

1003

2354

3357

43

1989

1168

3238

4406

104 2010

964

2317

3281

-76

1990

1147

3181

4328

-78 2012

944

2248

3192

-89

1991

1106

2678

3784

-544 2014

899

2189

3088

-104
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Table 4 gives a description of the mothers during their lives when their first (or only)
child is five years old. The timeline of the summary statistics, then, is not in terms of the
calendar year but in terms of lifespan in relative to the birth of the first child. There are 2,163
more mothers in group B then in group A when their first child is five years old. When observing
the real wage, while group A’s minimum and maximum are both lower than those of group B, all
quartiles are higher for group A compared to group B. The observation suggests two things.
Firstly, while the minimum and maximum real wage earners of group B perform better than their
group A counterparts, group A earns more as an overall group at the time in their lives when
their first child is five years old. Secondly, more socioeconomic inequality may exist amongst
group B members, as its positive outlier earns 8.19 more in real wage than its group A
counterpart despite group A’s higher overall real wage.
Both groups possess a majority of white mothers, followed by Black mothers and then
Hispanic mothers. The race group “Others” includes Asians, Native Americans, and others.
Group A is generally older than group B when giving birth to the first child, and compared to
group B, a higher percentage of group A is married. While the majority of both groups are high
school graduates, group A is more educated than group B in general, with higher percentages of
group A for high school, college, and graduate school educations.
While reading this summary statistics, the reader may ask “Are more members of
group A highly educated, married, and older (which all signal stability) because they have
received paid leave or have they received paid leave because they are highly educated, married,
and older?” This is the typical “the egg or the chicken” dilemma that mankind has been
grappling with since the beginning of time. Although this question of “which is the cause?” is
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important, this seven month long undergraduate thesis does not have the time or the resources to
even begin tackling this question. For this reason, we will put this question on the shelf for future
research.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Mothers when First Child is 5 Years Old
Group A
Number of Females

Group B
888

3051

Minimum

0.01

0.31

Quartile 1

11.2

8.27

Quartile 2

16.58

10.89

Quartile 3

23.79

14.55

Maximum

166.52

174.71

Minimum

19

18

Quartile 1

25

23

Quartile 2

29

25

Quartile 3

33

28

Maximum

50

47

Black

24.66%

27.11%

Hispanic

20.83%

15.80%

White

42.23%

43.20%

Other

12.27%

13.90%

Less than HS

6.19%

25.89%

High School

70.61%

66.73%

College

14.30%

5.24%

8.90%

2.13%

Never Married

15.20%

23.70%

Married, Spouse Present

68.13%

59.46%

Separated/Divorced

16.67%

16.85%

Real Wage

Age

Race

Education

Masters/PHd
Marital Status
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Figure 1 plots out the median real wages across time for both groups. Time is not defined
by the calendar year but by the age of the first child of the mothers. Time equals 0 for the year
that the first child was born. The range for the time is [-5 , 25]. In figure 2, we plot a) the gap of
median real wage and b) ratio of median real wage. For the chart of the gap, when y equals 0, it
means that on average, there is no difference between group A’s median real wage and group B’s
median real wage. For the chart of the ratio, when y equals 1, it implies that the median real
wage of group A is equal to the median real wage of group B in a situation of median real wage
parity. Figure 2 suggests that after 15 years of first child’s birth, there is a lot of noise in the data.
Analyzing figure 1, we can gather that on average, women who received a paid leave
earn a higher real wage throughout their life, regardless of race. In order to get information on
the real wage difference between group A and group B, we analyze figure 2. The first chart of
figure 2 shows that, on average, the real wage gap grows years prior to the birth of the first child,
reflecting anticipation for childbirth. The gap growth slows down over time, but the following
pattern persists for the most part: the gap is the largest between whites, followed by others,
hispanics, and blacks. The second chart of figure 2 highlights how close or far parity is. The
racial group that is closest to parity is black. However, we must remember the relevancy of
achieving parity in the context where everyone in the group is earning lower than other groups.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Med Real wages Over Time Since Birth of First Child Across Race
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Figure 2: Gap of Med Real Wage and Ratio of Med Real Wage
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Creation of Variables
Weeksgap
Weeksgap was created from the NLSY-79 variable “WEEKSWORKED,” which measured
the amount of weeks out of the 52 work weeks the respondent has worked. For our purposes, we
were interested in the effect a leave has on the real wage. Thus, we created weeksgap to more
directly measure the relationship we are interested in.
Numchildren and Birthgap
NLSY-79 provides the variable called NUMCH which asks the respondent how many
number of biological, step, and/or adopted children live in the respondent’s household. However,
we are only interested in the biological children since step and adopted children do not require
the same kind of leave from work a biological child would. For this reason, we use CxDOB,
which asks the respondent the date of birth of the respondent’s biological child. CxDOB captures
up to 11 children, allowing us to measure up to 10 birthgaps.
Birthgap measures the amount of years between the oldest and the youngest child, acting
as a proxy to measure the mother’s intention to baby bunch by having more children in a shorter
period of time to reduce the time away from work.
Years of Education and Marital Status
We created dummies for the three levels of education: less than high school, college, and
Masters/PhD with high school graduates as the omitted reference group. Similarly, we created a
dummy for marriage where it equals 1 if the respondent is married and equals 0 if the respondent
is not married.

28

Regional Unemployment
NLSY-79 collects data on the respondent’s region of residence. This region has four
categories: Northeast, South, Midwest, and West. We then gather regional unemployment data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. With the unemployment data in possession, we match the
respondents with the unemployment rate according to their region of residence for the year. After
each respondent has the appropriate unemployment, we created logu that takes the natural log of
unemployment.
Age
Age was only asked in 1979, when all the respondents were within 14 to 19 years of age.
This required us to modify the given age variable so that
age = age + (current year - 1979)

[5.3]

to ensure that the variable keeps up with time.
Real Wage
Although NLSY-79 had information for respondents for up to 8 jobs, the data was not
always reliable due to respondents skipping the questions without reason or not participating the
interview at all for certain years. Furthermore, NLSY-79 only provided the nominal wages for up
to 5 jobs, with respondents again not participating or skipping. For this reason, we decided to be
safe with our data and chose to only use the nominal wage of job 1, the primary job for most
respondents.
With information of the national inflation rate gathered from the Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED), we adjust the nominal wage to get the real wage. If we had more time,
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we would have hunted for regional inflation data instead of national so that we could better
adjust the nominal wage to reflect the circumstances of respondents more appropriately.
After we calculate the real wage from the nominal wage, we created the dependent
variable Y that takes the natural log of the real wage. We decided to take the natural log of the
real wage because we are interested in the real wage growth. The natural log form of the
dependent variable allows us to interpret the independent coefficients according to our interests.
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Table 5: Definition of Variables
Variable

Created
?

Definition

Age

Yes

Age of individual

Age2

Yes

Age of individual, squared

Children

Yes

Number of biological children under age 18 years in
household

Weeksgap

Yes

Number of weeks not worked out of 52 work weeks during
year t-1

Numjobsyear

No

Number of jobs held during year t

Birthgap

Yes

The amount of years between birth of first child and birth of
last child divided by the number of biological children

Birthgap*age

Yes

Interaction of birthgap and age

Birthgap*age2

Yes

Interaction of birthgap and age2

logu

Yes

Log of average unemployment rate of the region for year t

Yes

Omitted reference category for education
1 if individual did not graduate from high school, 0 otherwise
1 if individual received some college education, 0 otherwise
1 if individual graduated from college, 0 otherwise
1 if individual pursued further education post-college, 0
otherwise

Yes

Dummy that is 1 if individual is married, 0 otherwise

Educ Dummies
➢ HS graduate
➢ Less than HS
➢ Some college
➢ College
➢ Masters/PhD
Marriagedummy
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Chapter 6: Empirical Results

Fixed effects Generalized Least Squares Regressions
To account for time invariant variables that cannot be easily observed in the panel data
and serial correlation over time, we opted for fixed effect generalized least squares regressions.
Other invariant variables, such as race and gender, are also accounted for even though they are
observable. Including these variables in a fixed effects model will result in the canceling out of
the variable since there is no change over time for a person regarding their race and gender. For
this reason, race and gender are not included in our models. We also point out that the fixed
effects nature of the models would address, to a certain degree, misspecification, which is
something all models are vulnerable to.

Hausman Test
To test our intuition that fixed effects regressions should be utilized, we use the Hausman
test, whose null hypothesis is that the estimator from the random effects model is an efficient and
consistent estimator of the true parameters, meaning that there is no systematic difference
between the estimators of the fixed effects and random effects. Because the Hausman test cannot
be conducted with robust standard errors, we used the models with their plain standard errors.
After the Hausman test has been run, however, we analyze the seven models with their robust
standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity, which we will talk more about. For all models
of both groups, we reject the Hausman tests, suggesting that using fixed effects regressions is
more appropriate for this analysis.
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Table 6: Hausman test for mothers’ models2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Group A

reject

reject

reject

reject

reject

reject

reject

Group B

reject

reject

reject

reject

reject

reject

reject

Correlation Coefficients
In order to assess the strength and direction of the correlation between variables, we find
the correlation coefficients between different pairs of variables we are interested in using.
Considering that correlation coefficients measure the linear relationships between variables, we
exclude any non-linear variables such as age2 and the interaction variables. Doing this, we find
that weeksgap and numjobsyear form the only pair that possesses a correlation coefficient higher
than 0.5. The model that possess both of these variables is model 5.
Table 7: Correlation Coefficients
age

age

2

educ

logu

marr num~ar pa~ve

w~gap

b~gap

1

educ

0.26

1

logu

-0.28

-0.1

1

marr

0.16

0.19

-0.1

1

num~year

-0.21

0.15

0.09

-0.03

1

paidleave

0.03

0.04

-0.06

0.03

-0.01

1

weeksgap

-0.2

-0.29

0.11

-0.08

-0.65

-0.04

1

birthgap

0.48

-0.04

-0.2

0.1

-0.18

0.04

0.04

1

See Appendix B for the Hausman tests.
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Robust inference
To address heteroskedasticity, we use robust inference for all the models. Given that
group A has roughly 1000 participants and group B has roughly 25000 means we can safely
assume that the sample is large enough for us to use robust standard errors confidently. We use
the word roughly because the sample size varies from year to year as participants could not
answer for certain years.

Regressions
The regression results are organized into two tables, one for group A and another for
group B. Each group has 7 models, out of which model 1 is the most basic. All 14 regression
results can be viewed in detail in Appendix A.
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Table 9: Group A, robust se
N = observations
y=ln(realwage)
weeksgap

27,537
model 1

model 3

(-52.38)

(-51.90)

Masters/PhD dum

logu

model 4

model 5

(-52.13)

(-45.09)

-0.0693*** -0.0719*** -0.0774***

-0.0762***

(-5.26)

(-5.90)

(-5.46)

(-5.96)

Less than HS dum -0.1181*** -0.1182*** -0.0742*

College dum

27,537

27,732
model 6

model 7

-0.0301*** -0.0301*** -0.0300*** -0.0303*** -0.0278*** -0.0302*** -0.0302***
(-52.36)

numchildren

model 2

27,732

(-52.07)

(-52.17)

-0.0816*

-0.0510

-0.0782*

-0.0829*

(-3.53)

(-3.53)

(-2.24)

(-2.47)

(-1.55)

(-2.35)

(-2.48)

0.3135***

0.3067***

0.2827***

0.2951***

0.2813***

0.2936***

0.2957***

(9.29)

(9.11)

(8.31)

(8.68)

(8.23)

(8.63)

(8.69)

0.3003***

0.2915***

0.2724***

0.2859***

0.2769***

0.2870***

0.2901***

(6.26)

(6.08)

(5.69)

(5.92)

(5.77)

(5.95)

(6.02)

-0.0348

-0.0362

(-0.53)

(-0.56)
0.0304

0.0235

0.0094

0.0314*

0.0110

0.0133

(1.90)

(1.50)

(0.60)

(2.00)

(0.70)

(0.85)

0.0254***

0.0797***

0.0650***

0.0846***

0.0685***

0.0636***

(13.78)

(5.76)

(4.71)

(6.06)

(4.87)

(4.39)

marriagedummy

age

age^2

-0.0008*** -0.0006**

-0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0006**

(-3.92)

(-4.16)

birthgap

(-3.19)

(-3.39)

(-2.88)

-0.0067

-0.0405

-0.2030*

(-0.98)

(-1.80)

(-2.23)

0.0009

0.0095*

(1.39)

(2.00)

numjobsyear

0.0799***
(7.82)

birthgap*age

birthgap*age^2

-0.0001
(-1.83)

constant

R-sqr

2.1211***

1.6829***

0.8641***

1.0840***

0.6306**

1.0376***

1.1038***

(17.34)

(12.63)

(4.34)

(5.47)

(3.11)

(5.15)

(5.35)

0.3950

0.3952

0.3952

0.3935

0.3976

0.3936

0.3937

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 10: Group B, robust se
N = observations
y=ln(realwage)
weeksgap

73,097
model 1

model 3

73,097
model 4

model 5

73,865
model 6

model 7

-0.0328*** -0.0327*** -0.0327*** -0.0330*** -0.0264*** -0.0329*** -0.0329***
(-122.23)

numchildren

model 2

73,865

(-121.88)

(-121.96)

(-124.04)

(-83.39)

-0.0912*** -0.0866*** -0.0928***

-0.0893***

(-11.48)

(-11.62)

(-10.96)

(-11.73)

(-122.85)

(-122.69)

Less than HS dum -0.1153*** -0.1195*** -0.1059*** -0.1182*** -0.0765*** -0.1130*** -0.1149***

College dum

Masters/PhD dum

logu

(-6.08)

(-6.28)

(-5.46)

(-6.12)

(-4.00)

(-5.87)

(-5.97)

0.1463***

0.1604***

0.1553***

0.1571***

0.1608***

0.1564***

0.1585***

(4.30)

(4.71)

(4.54)

(4.58)

(4.75)

(4.56)

(4.62)

0.2238***

0.2414***

0.2418***

0.2350***

0.2709***

0.2398***

0.2431***

(5.40)

(5.83)

(5.86)

(5.66)

(6.46)

(5.80)

(5.87)

-0.0239

-0.0242

(-0.50)

(-0.51)

marriagedummy

-0.0563*** -0.0610*** -0.0756*** -0.0455*** -0.0731*** -0.0708***

age

(-5.15)

(-5.58)

(-6.93)

(-4.22)

(-6.73)

(-6.51)

0.0181***

0.0456***

0.0270**

0.0541***

0.0325***

0.0282**

(19.38)

(5.18)

(3.13)

(6.09)

(3.70)

(3.17)

-0.0004**

-0.0002

-0.0005*** -0.0003*

-0.0002

(-3.13)

(-1.44)

(-3.70)

(-1.59)

age^2

birthgap

(-2.17)

-0.0345***

-0.0897*** -0.2187***

(-6.88)

(-5.74)

(-4.40)

0.0015***

0.0087**

(3.52)

(3.27)

numjobsyear

0.1875***
(33.12)

birthgap*age

birthgap*age^2

-0.0001**
(-2.75)

constant

R-sqr

2.1057***

1.7887***

1.3650***

1.6191***

0.8238***

1.5465***

1.6051***

(24.56)

(20.31)

(10.82)

(13.12)

(6.44)

(12.33)

(12.65)

0.3947

0.3951

0.3946

0.3929

0.4085

0.3931

0.3932

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Interpretation of Coefficients
Education and age
For both groups, the seven models produced estimators with the expected signs for
education, and age. According to all the models that incorporate age and age2, age has a marginal
effect on real wage growth. The marginal effect increases at a decreasing rate over time. After a
certain point in age, an increase in age leads to a decrease in the real wage growth. In order to
calculate this point of age where age stops having a positive effect and starts having a negative
effect, we find the points of age where the derivative of the regression function equals 0. If x
represents age, then the marginal effect of age on real wage growth can be derived as follows.
Y = β8x + β9x2
dy
dx

[6.1]
[6.2]

= β8 + 2β9x

If we set the derivative equal to 0, then
-2β9x = β8

[6.3]

x = β8/(-2β9)

[6.4]

By plugging in the appropriate β8 and β9 from the 7 models for both groups, we can calculate the
turning point where age begins having a negative effect on real wage growth. Below is a table
indicating these turning points across models and groups.
Table 11: Points of Age Where Marginal Effects of Age is Zero Across Models
age

model 3

model 4

model 5

model 6

model 7

Group A

49.81

54.17

52.88

48.93

53

Group B

57

67.5

54.1

54.16

70.5
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We see that group B members’ age stops having a positive effect and starts having a
negative effect on the real wage growth later on in their lives when compared to group A
members. This could be due to several factors. Group A members may decrease their workload
earlier on in their lives and thus experience a decline in real wage growth earlier when compared
to group B. Group A members may also experience positive real wage growth earlier on in their
lives. If so, then group A members will experience the decreasing part of the marginal effects
trajectory earlier in their lives than group B members.
The coefficients for the education dummies indicate that higher education contributes
more positively to the real wage of group A. Throughout all the models for group A, the
coefficients for college and master/PhD dummies are higher while the coefficient for less than
HS dummy is lower in comparison to group B. This suggests that a) the mothers from group A
are self-selecting for higher-paying jobs than those applied by mothers from group B and/or
b) group A and group B face circumstances in their lives that are not accounted for by the
models.
Numjobsyear
Numjobsyear could have had a coefficient with either a negative sign or a positive sign.
The coefficient would have been negative if the multiple jobs were not complementary, having a
net negative effect on the realwage of the individual. For this sample of females, however, the
coefficient for the variable numjobsyear is positive, implying that the jobs were complementary
and beneficial to the primary real wage. Model 5 predicts that for both groups, an increase of
total number of jobs held per year by one job leads to an increase in real wage: 8% for group A
and 18.7% for group B.
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Weeksgap and numchildren
In all seven models, the variable weeksgap was negative and significant for both groups.
For all models except model 5, the coefficients for group B were consistently larger in absolute
value by 0.003, suggesting that a week increase in work absence has a more negative effect on
real wage for group B than for group A. Similarly, relative to group A, the amount of children
has a more negative effect on the real wage of group B. The biggest difference is with model 1
where an increase of children by 1 child is expected to have a 6.9% decrease in real wage for
group A and 9.1% for group B, and the smallest difference is with model 5 where an increase of
children by 1 child is expected to have a 7.6% decrease in real wage for group A and 8.9% for
group B.
Marriagedummy
The marriagedummy’s coefficient is consistently negative and significant throughout the
different models for group B, but it is only significant for group A in model 5, where it is
positive. Model 5, which has the highest R-squared for both groups and has the only significant
coefficient for marriagedummy for group A, predicts that compared to a woman who is not
married, a married woman is expected to earn 4.6% less if she is from group B and 3.1% more if
she is from group A. This outcome implies that women who received paid leaves benefit from
marriage more than women who did not receive paid leave. This may be explained by positive
assortative mating in marriage markets, “where high-quality men are matched with high-quality
women and low-quality men with low-quality women” (Becker 1991). As for our analysis, the
word “quality” can be replaced by “earning.” Our empirical results support Becker’s postulation:
mothers of group A, being more educated as an overall group, are self-selecting and gravitating
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towards more educated men who are high-earning, whereas mothers of group B, being less
educated as an overall group, are gravitating towards men who earn less than the husbands for
group A.
Birthgap, birthgap*age, and birthgap*age2
The only model where all of the three variables concerning birthgap are significant is
model 7. If x represents birthgap, then the marginal effect of birthgap on real wage can be
derived as follows:
Y = β10x + β12x*age + β13x*age2
dy
dx

[6.5]
[6.6]

= β10 + β12age + β13*age2

Thus, the marginal effect of birthgap on real wage is
-0.2030 + 0.0095*age - 0.0001*age2

[6.7]

-0.2187 + 0.0087*age - 0.0001*age2

[6.8]

for group A and

for group B, meaning that age has an effect on how birthgap affects the real wage. For this
reason, we calculate the marginal effect of birthgap across different values of age.
Table 12: Birthgap’s Marginal Effect on Real Wage Across Age
Group A
age

Group B

ME of birthgap

age

ME of birthgap

min = 14

-0.0896

min = 14

-0.1165

Quartile 1 = 23

-0.0374

Quartile 1 = 23

-0.0715

Quartile 2 = 29

-0.0116

Quartile 2 = 28

-0.0535

Quartile 3 = 39

-0.0154

Quartile 3 = 37

-0.0337

max = 57

-0.0136

max = 57

-0.0477
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From the calculations, we see that birthgap’s marginal effect on the real wage is stronger
in the beginning of a woman’s life and decreases over time. Model 7 predicts that at age 14, an
increase of birthgap by one year will lead to a decrease in real wage by 9.7% for group A and a
decrease of 11.3% for group B. As a mother grows older, an increase in birthgap has a gradually
smaller effect on her real wage growth. This makes sense, since it implies that taking more time
to give birth hurts the real wage growth more earlier in a woman’s life than later on. Later on, a
woman is able to afford to take more time to give birth since she has established more credibility
compared to a younger woman.
Before we conclude this assessment of the marginal effects of birthgap, we would like to
highlight that the table excludes the age where the marginal effects of birthgap equals 0. Upon
calculating, we found that group A’s equation [6.6] has two points of age where marginal effect
of birthgap equals 0. Within the age of 32.458 to 62.542, birthgap actually has a positive
marginal effect on the real wage growth. For group B, however, the marginal effect of birthgap
on the real wage growth is always negative. The maximum of group B’s equation [6.6] occurs at
age 43.5 when marginal effects of birthgap equals -0.029.
This implies that for women who received paid leave, there may be a time in their lives
when a higher birthgap (produced by less baby-bunching) has a positive correlation with the real
wage growth. For women who did not receive paid leave, however, increasing birthgap is never
associated with a higher real wage growth.
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Chapter 7: Summary and Concluding Remarks
The net effect of paid maternity leave on real wage growth is theoretically ambiguous.
While paid maternity leave reduces external leave-taking (unemployment), it also increases
internal leave-taking by subsidizing the leave and lowering opportunity costs of childbearing.
According to the human capital theory, work interruptions are detrimental to the real wage
growth, ceteris paribus. Whether or not to implement a paid maternity leave then depends on
whether or not paid maternity leave reduces the negative effects of leave-taking on the real wage
growth.
If paid maternity leave does indeed reduce the negative effect of leave-taking on the real
wage, then the positive effect of paid maternity leave (i.e. the reduction in external leave-taking)
prevails over its negative effect (i.e. the increase in internal leave-taking). Empirical tests will
help determine which of the two effects prevail in the real world.
According to our empirical results, leave-taking has a negative effect on the real wage
growth for both paid leave-takers (group A) and unpaid leave-takers (group B). However, the
negative effect of leave-taking on group B is larger than for group A. Throughout six of the
seven models for both groups, the coefficients for leave-taking (β1Aand β1B) follow this pattern.
Because of the consistently larger magnitude of β1B we reject the null hypothesis stating that |β1A|
equals |β1B|.
Although our findings provide support for the implementation of a paid maternity leave
policy, there are some caveats to keep in mind. We believe that implementing a paid maternity
leave policy that targets only women will strengthen the male-breadwinner model. Under the
male-breadwinner model, men (who do not face direct physical costs from childbearing)
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specialize in the market labor while women (who do face the direct physical costs) specialize in
the nonmarket labor, specifically homemaking. This decreases the financial autonomy of women,
which will leave them at a disadvantage in the case of divorce or death of the husband. Thus, in
this situation, adhering to societal norms could have a negative impact on women on their rainy
days.
We acknowledge that a paid maternity leave is necessary for physical and psychological
effects of pushing a human being out of one’s body into the world. However, we disagree with
focusing solely on mothers for childcare once the child is in the world. Fathers should also be the
target of the paid leave policies. Such a change towards paternity leave should be taken in
gradual steps as the state of New York is implementing their paid leave policy. New York
currently in 2018 sets their benefit amount at 50% of an employee’s average weekly wage, but in
2022, the state will set the amount at 67%. The gradual nature of the implementation will ease
the state’s employees and employers into the paid leave policy instead of creating a shock.
Other ways to encourage more fathers to take paternity leave is to provide the father’s
quota of shared parental leave only on the basis that fathers must use it or the couple loses it
completely. Research shows that even under a shared parental system, women end up taking
more time off of work compared to their male counterparts (O’Brien 2013). Providing paternity
leave on this use-it-or-lose-it basis will incentivize more men to be proactive in childrearing even
if they do not do the childbearing.
Another caveat to keep in mind is that the availability of paid leave is disproportional
across the socioeconomic levels. The statistics summary suggest that more educated women who
were already earning a higher wage were getting a wider access to paid leave than women who
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were not earning such a high wage and not as educated. If paid leave is meant to help women,
then the availability should be extended to beyond those who were already doing better off,
which leads us to our next point.
Although group B’s coefficient for weeksgap is larger in absolute value than that of group
A, we should be careful in making conclusions about whether or not paid maternity leave hurts
or helps mothers as a whole. Our sample was not a random sample of the whole population. Out
of the participants from NLSY-79, we picked out the mothers. Although we used fixed effects
generalized least squares estimators to account for this unrandom factor, this does not mean that
we can make general conclusions about the whole planet. My empirical results may suggest that
paid leave will help mothers, but future researchers should strive to confirm or reject my findings
on a national level with various sets of data.
Concerning birthgap, our empirical results suggest that it may be in the interest of the
mother to reduce birthgap. Thus, the mother should baby-bunch by having the desired amount of
babies in the shortest time biologically possible. A woman who baby-bunches, however, must
keep in mind the health consequences of having babies consecutively, since childbearing without
recovery time in between may affect the woman’s health negatively. The potential biological
effects, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. The analysis also suggests that the
baby-bunching should take place later on in a woman’s career after she has established
credibility in her work environment, as opposed to earlier.
With more time and more mathematical background, I would have implemented
techniques to conduct a joint hypothesis test across the non-nested models across group A and
group B. Despite the limitations, we created fixed effects generalized least squares estimators to
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account for serial correlation, misspecification, and heteroskedasticity. We have tried our best to
be as transparent as possible. In order to examine or extend on my work, please visit
https://github.com/soehan/maternityleavethesis for a complete collection of my data and do-files.
Hopefully this analysis has been helpful for those who are curious in paid maternity leave and
similar topics. Thank you for taking the time to read this work.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Fixed Effects Models
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Appendix B: Hausman Tests
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